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COMMENT
THE DEMISE OF THE "IRON CURTAIN" STATUTE
From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron
curtain has descended across the Continent.1
Let us not be deceived - today we are in the midst of a cold war.2
I. INTRODUCTION
The American belief that these two metaphors, "iron curtain" and
"cold war," aptly described the political aftermath of World War II
resulted in a number of legal restrictions on the ability of residents of
countries behind the "iron curtain" to inherit property of American
decedents. The United States was the only country that presented
obstacles to the distribution of funds to "iron curtain" beneficiaries.3
There were, however, never any limitations under American laws, state
or federal, upon the transfer of funds by living American citizens.
4
Thus, a decedent whose estate funds during this period could not be sent
to his relatives because of an "iron curtain" statute, could at any time
during his life have forwarded gifts through any American bank to those
same relatives or friends.
At the outset, it should be noted that no "iron curtain" act makes
mention of any "iron curtain" and none contains any geographic limita-
tions on the scope of its application. During the post-war period, however,
these statutes became commonly known as such because they were con-
sistently applied to beneficiaries residing in the Soviet Union and the
Eastern European countries. 5
A great many states, primarily on the east and west coasts of the
United States, have enacted "iron curtain" statutes and much has been
written in legal literature concerning them.6 The statutes are of two
1. Address of Winston Churchill, Westminster College, Fulton, Mo., Mar. 5,
1946, in E. GOLDMAN, THE CRUCIAL DECADE 37 (rev. ed. 1960) (emphasis added).
2. Address of Bernard Baruch, Columbia, S.C., Apr. 16, 1947, in E. GOLDMAN,
supra note 1, at 60 (emphasis added). The phrase was picked up by Walter Lippman
and made a commonplace of American language. Id.
3. See Birman, Soviet Heirs in American Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 258
(1962).
4. Id. The relevant period herein extended from approximately 1953 to the
present. One can purchase a dollar remittance from an American bank which will
transfer the dollars to the U.S.S.R. Bank for Foreign Trade, located in Moscow,
which will in turn deliver rubles to the Soviet payee at the official exchange rate.
5. See Heyman, The Nonresident Alien's Right to Succession under the "Iron
Curtain Rule," 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 221 (1957).
6. See, e.g., Bader, Brown & Grzybowski, Soviet Inheritance Cases in American
Courts and the Soviet Property Regime, 1966 DUKE L.J. 98; Birman, supra note 4;
Chaitkin, The Rights of Residents of Russia and its Satellites to Share in Estates
of American Decedents, 25 S. CAL. L. REv. 297 (1952); Heyman, supra note 5;
Comment, The Statutory Regulation of Inheritance by Nonresident Aliens, 13 VILL.
L. REV. 148 (1968).
(49)
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general types: custodial, 7 providing that distribution not be made where
it appears that the beneficiary would not receive the use, benefit, enjoy-
ment, and control of the funds if sent to him; and reciprocal,8 providing
that distribution not be made unless the country of the alien's residence
grants inheritance rights to American citizens. The operative provision of
the Pennsylvania act, a typical custodial statute, provided that:
Whenever it shall appear to the court that if distribution were made
a beneficiary would not have the actual benefit, use, enjoyment or
control of the money or other property distributed to him by a
fiduciary, the court shall have the power and authority to direct a
fiduciary (a) to make payment of the share of such beneficiary at
such times and in such manner and amounts as the court may deem
proper, or (b) to withhold distribution of the share of such bene-
7. Custodial statutes exist in: Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-278(Supp. 1972) (burden of proof on state), construed in Lamb v. Estate of Szabo,27 Conn. Supp. 247, 235 A.2d 849 (Super. Ct. 1967); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 731.28 (1964), discussed in 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 412, 415 (1969) ; Maryland, MD.
ANN. CODE art. 93, § 9-108 (1957) ; Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 206,§ 27A (Supp. 1972), construed in In re Mazurowski, 331 Mass. 33, 116 N.E.2d 854(1954) ; Michigan, MIcH. ComP. LAW § 2 7 .3178(306a) (Supp. 1972) ; New Jersey,
N.J. REv. STAT. § 3A:25-10 (1953) (burden of proof on state), held constitutional
in In re Kish's Estate, 52 N.J. 454, 246 A.2d 1 (1968) (see text accompanying notes65-78 infra); New York, N.Y. SURE. CT. PRO. § 2218 (McKinney Supp. 1971)(burden of proof on alien; assignment prohibited), held constitutional in In re
Leikind, 22 N.Y.2d 346, 239 N.E.2d 550, 292 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1968), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Laikind v. Attorney Gen., 397 U.S. 148 (1970), and in Bjarsch v. DiFalco,
314 F. Supp. 127 (2d Cir. 1970), noted in 12 HARV. INT'L L.J. 120 (1971) (see text
accompanying notes 44-64 infra) ; Ohio, OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.81 (Page
1968), held unconstitutional in Mora v. Battin, 303 F. Supp. 660 (N.D. Ohio 1969)(see text accompanying notes 79-87 infra) ; Oregon, Law of Mar. 6, 1937, ch. 217,§§ 1 & 2, [1937] Ore. Laws 306-08, held unconstitutional in Zschernig v. Miller,
389 U.S. 429 (1968), repealed by Law of June 1, 1969, ch. 591, § 305, [1969] Ore.
Laws 1221 (effective July 1, 1970); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-13-13(1970) ; Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 863.37 (1971).
8. Reciprocity statutes exist in: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-212(c)(1956), construed in Podret v. Superior Ct., 80 Ariz. 182, 294 P.2d 670 (1956);
California, CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 1956) (burden of proof on alien; escheatif no other heirs), held unconstitutional in Estate of Kraemer, 276 Cal. App. 2d 715,81 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1969) ; Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 567.8 (Supp. 1972) (burden of
proof on alien; escheat if no other heirs), construed in In re Millers' Estate, 159
N.W.2d 441 (Iowa 1968), discussed in Ginsburgs, Inheritance by Foreigners under
Soviet Law, 51 IOWA L. REV. 16 (1965), and in Note, Property Rights of Aliens
under Iowa and Federal Law, 47 IowA L. REv. 105 (1961); Louisiana, LA. CIv.
CODE ANN. art. 1490 (West 1952), discussed in In re Herdman, 154 La. 477, 97 So. 664(1923), and in Comment, The Application of the Reciprocal Rights and Benefit
Rules to Foreign Legacies, 36 TUL. L. REV. 799 (1962); Montana, MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 91-520 (1964) (burden of proof on alien; escheat if no other heirs),held constitutional in Gorun v. Fall, 287 F. Supp. 725 (D. Mont.), aff'd per curiam,
393 U.S. 398 (1968), and in Giurgiu Estate, 155 Mont. 18, 466 P.2d 83 (1970) (see
text accompanying notes 37-43 infra) ; Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 134.230 (1967)(burden of proof on alien; escheat if no other heirs) ; North Carolina, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 64-3 (1965) (burden of proof on alien); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 60,§ 121 (1971) (personal property) ; Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 2-43 (Supp. 1971)(escheat if no other heirs).
Reciprocity is not a matter of quantity of funds passing between the UnitedStates and the country involved. For various economic reasons, more funds have
been accumulated by citizens of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries
residing in the United States than by such citizens living in their own countries.
Reciprocity, it will be seen, means merely that, upon a "routine reading" of foreignlaw, no barriers exist to distribution to heirs in this country. See text accompanying
note 17 supra.
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ficiary, convert it to cash, and pay it through the Department of
Revenue into the State Treasury without escheat. 9
This Comment will focus on the demise of "iron curtain" statutes
generally, and, in particular, on the Pennsylvania statute recently held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. °
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA
Two United States Supreme Court cases address themselves to the
constitutionality of "iron curtain" statutes. In Clark v. Allen," Justice
Douglas, writing for the Court, upheld the constitutionality of section 259
of the California Probate Code, 12 a reciprocity statute. At that time, the
objection that the statute interfered with international relations appeared
to him to be "farfetched.' u3 What California had done, it was felt, would
have "some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries,"' 4 but would
not constitute an incursion upon the federal government's power to con-
duct foreign affairs.' 5
Twenty-one years later, in Zschernig v. Miller,16 Justice Douglas
again had occasion to consider the constitutionality of these statutes. In
the meantime, probate courts in the various states had developed a body
of precedent indicating a distinctly hostile judicial attitude toward claim-
ants and their counsel who sought to transmit American funds through
state courts to beneficiaries behind the "iron curtain." As Justice Douglas
made explicit in Zschernig:
At the time Clark v. Allen was decided, the case seemed to involve
no more than a routine reading of foreign laws. It now appears that
in this reciprocity area under inheritance statutes, the probate courts
of various States have launched inquiries into the type of govern-
ments that obtain in particular foreign nations - whether aliens
under their law have enforceable rights, whether the so-called "rights"
are merely dispensations turning upon the whim or caprice of the
government officials, whether the representation of consuls, am-
9. Act of July 23, 1953, Pamph. L. 674, § 2 (emphasis added). Section 737 of
the Fiduciaries Act of April 18, 1949, Pamph. L. 512, § 737, added by the Act
of Feb. 23, 1956, Pamph. L. [1955] 1084, § 6, contained a similar provision and
was likewise unconstitutional in light of Demczuk Estate, 444 Pa. 212, 282 A.2d 700(1971). See text accompanying notes 94-108 infra.
Both of these acts have recently been repealed by the new Probate, Estates
and Fiduciaries Code, PA. STAT. tit. 20, § 3 (effective July 1, 1972).
10. Demczuk Estate, 444 Pa. 212, 282 A.2d 700 (1971).
11. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
12. CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 1956). See text accompanying notes 89-93
supra.
13. 331 U.S. at 517.
14. Id.
15. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, provides, in relevant part:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . and all Treaties .
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
16. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
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bassadors, and other representatives of foreign nations is credible or
made in good faith, whether there is in the actual administration in
the particular foreign system of law any element of confiscation.1 7
Justice Douglas explicitly did not accept the invitation to re-examine
the Court's ruling in Clark v. Allen,'8 but instead relied on the history
and operation of the statute19 in holding it, as applied, to be "an intrusion
by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution en-
trusts to the President and the Congress. 20
Justice Douglas appeared to be quite conscious of his dilemma -
attempting to maintain the vitality of Clark v. Allen and at the same time,
in the light of later learning, to hold unconstitutional a practically iden-
tical statute:
We held in Clark v. Allen that a general reciprocity clause did not
on its face intrude on the federal domain . . . [noting] that the
California statute, then a recent enactment, would have only "some
incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries."'
The Zschernig Court seemed to plead the Clark Court's ignorance of the
potential for interference with foreign affairs inherent in such Statutes:
[W]e had no reason to suspect that the California statute in Clark
v. Allen was to be applied as anything other than a general reciprocity
provision, requiring a just matching of laws.22
Had the case appeared in the posture of the present one, a different
result would have been obtained. We were there concerned with the
words of a statute on its face, not the manner of its application. 2
Justice Douglas noted that decisions in the wake of Clark v. Allen
radiated attitudes of the "cold war."'24 Due to their "great potential for
disruption or embarrassment, ' 25 Justice Douglas now considered them
to have more than "some incidental or indirect effect in foreign coun-
tries .... "26 "The statute as construed" now seemed "to make un-
avoidable judicial criticism of nations established on a more authoritarian
basis than our own."'27  It was now "inescapable"2 8 that this type of
probate law would affect international relations in a "persistent and subtle
way," would have a "direct impact upon foreign relations," and might
17. Id. at 433-34.
18. Id. at 432.
19. Law of Mar. 6, 1937, ch. 217, §§ 1 & 2, [1937] Ore. Laws 306-08 (repealed,
Law of June 1, 1969, ch. 591, § 305, [1969] Ore. Laws 1221 (effective July 1, 1970)).
20. 389 U.S. at 432.
21. Id. at 432-33.
22. Id. at 433 n.5.
23. Id. at 433.
24. Id. at 435.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 434.
27. Id. at 440 (emphasis added).
28. Id. (emphasis added).
[VOL. 18
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well "adversely affect the power of the central government to deal with
those problems. '29
Justices Stewart and Brennan, concurring, rejected Justice Douglas'
distinction between the constitutionality of these statutes on their face and
as applied and would have explicitly overruled Clark v. Allen.30 Academic
criticism has likewise been unsympathetic to the distinction.8 '
Justice Harlan, while concurring in the result, dissented on the con-
stitutional issue . 2 In his opinion, "nothing [had] occurred which could
not readily have been foreseen at the time Clark v. Allen was decided."8 8
His was, perhaps, the first indication of the uncertainty which the Court's
opinion would create among the states as to its scope as evidenced by his
statement that "the Court seems to have found the statute unconstitutional
only as applied. 84
III. THE CONFUSED RESPONSE
The response of the various state supreme courts to the Supreme
Court's decision in Zschernig has been mixed. New Jersey, New York,
Montana, and Ohio statutes have been upheld as constitutional, although
for all practical purposes rendered impotent ;35 California and Pennsyl-
vania statutes have been struck down as unconstitutional.86
It is perhaps best to first consider developments in those states which
upheld the constitutionality of their statutes. The narrow scope of their
constitutionally permissible application, however, will indicate the slight
practical effect such statutes will have in the future.
In Gorun v. Fall,87 a three-judge federal district court in Montana
held that state probate courts, "advised by Zschernig of the boundaries of
29. Id. at 440-41.
30. Id. at 442 (Stewart & Brennan, JJ., concurring).
31. Zschernig was noted and the distinction criticized in 72 Dicic. L. REv. 675,
678-79 n.16 (1968) ; 82 HARV. L. REv. 238, 239 (1968) ; 53 IowA L. REv. 1347, 1359(1968); 2 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 363, 368-71 (1969); 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 661,
680 (1969). But see 32 ALBANY L. Rxv. 646, 653 (1968); 13 VILL. L. REV. 672,
674-80 (1968).
32. Justice Harlan would have preferred to avoid the constitutional issue as did
Justice Rutledge, in his concurring opinion in Clark v. Allen, by describing the
constitutional issue as "premature:"
It is more important that constitutional decisions be reserved until the issues
calling for them are squarely and inescapably presented, factually as well as
legally, than it is to expedite the termination of litigation or [sic] the procedural
convenience of the parties.
331 U.S. at 518. Harlan expressed similar sentiments in Zschernig and would have
reached the same result as the majority by a different interpretation of the 1923
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Germany, Dec. 8, 1923,
44 Stat. 2132, T.S. No. 725. 389 U.S. at 443-62. The Court had earlier established
that, where such statutes conflicted with federal treaties, the supremacy clause clearly
rendered them unconstitutional. See Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961);
Belemecich's Estate, 411 Pa. 506, 192 A.2d 740 (1963), rev'd sub nor. Consul Gen.
v. Pennsylvania, 375 U.S. 395 (1964).
33. 389 U.S. at 458.
34. Id. at 459 (emphasis added).
35. See notes 37-87 and accompanying text infra.
36. See notes 88-108 and accompanying text infra.
37. 287 F. Supp. 725 (D. Mont.), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 398 (1968).
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the constitutional power of the state . . . should be free to fashion a pro-
cedure for applying [Montana's reciprocity statute] in a manner not
offensive to the Federal Constitution.13 8 Although Gorun was affirmed
per curiam, Justice Douglas, writing for four members of the Court,
concurred, suggesting that federal foreign policy would require that, on
remand, the state court not find reciprocity to be lacking.3 9 On remand,4"
the Supreme Court of Montana returned the estate involved to the lower
probate court, which it believed to be quite "capable of fashioning the
procedures by which a determination can be made whether the Country
of Romania allows reciprocity of transfer and reciprocity of inheritance
between it and citizens of Montana."'4 1 It is submitted that such a re-
strained reading of the Court's opinions in this area was unfortunate.
The result was a remand to determine reciprocity in which the burden of
proof was on the foreign claimant.42 Thus, even after the decision in
Zschernig, a nonresident alien claiming funds in Montana must carry the
burden of proving reciprocity of inheritance in favor of American citi-
zens in the country of his residence. However, after Zschernig, the burden
must be reasonable and may only be satisfied by a showing that, upon a
"routine reading" 43 of the foreign law involved, no confiscation is appar-
ent. The burden, therefore, may be more apparent than real.
Similarly in In re Leikind,44 the Court of Appeals of New York
upheld the constitutionality of its custodial statute,45 holding that:
[I]f the courts of this State, in applying the "benefit or use or con-
trol" requirements, simply determine, without animadversions, whether
or not a foreign country, by statute or otherwise, prevents its resi-
dents from actually sharing in the estates of New York decedents, the
statute would not be unconstitutional under the explicit rationale of
the Zschernig case. 46
The Leikind decision is a masterpiece of legal make-weighting. In its
apology for the New York statute, the court mentioned that it, unlike
Oregon's statute, contained no provision for reciprocity or escheat, and
suggested that "even though the Oregon escheat provision was not dis-
cussed or made a ground of decision by the Supreme Court," that fact
might be of "critical importance" in upholding New York's statute.4 T
38. Id. at 728.
39. 393 U.S. at 399.
40. Giurgiu Estate, 155 Mont. 18, 466 P.2d 83 (1970).
41. Id. at 21, 466 P.2d at 84.
42. See MONT. R. Civ. P. 44.1, in MONT REV. CODEs ANN. § 93-2701 (Supp.
1971).
43. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
44. 22 N.Y.2d 346, 239 N.E.2d 550, 292 N.Y.S.2d 681, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 148(1970).
45. N.Y. SURR. CT. PRO. § 2218 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
46. 22 N.Y.2d at 352, 239 N.E.2d at 553, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 685.
47. Id. at 351, 239 N.E.2d at 553, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 685. "Escheat" is the
"reversion of property to the state in consequence of a want of any individual
competent to inherit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 640 (rev, 4th ed. 1968).
[VOL. 18
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It was only in a footnote that the court indicated that "the sweep of the
[Zschernig] opinion might suggest to some that in a later case the court
might hold that in reality no such statute could ever be restricted to a
'routine reading',"48 and, therefore, that such statutes are impossible of
constitutional application.
The New York court also emphasized that the claimant in Leikind
had "made no showing that the lower courts . . . have currently engaged
in the conduct criticized" 49 in Zschernig as interfering with foreign rela-
tions. It is clear, however, that the Zschernig Court made no mention
of the conduct of the Oregon courts in that particular case, but rather
emphasized only the general tendency of probate courts across the coun-
try to interfere with foreign relations. ° It was again, however, only in
a footnote, that the court confessed that "certain of the examples cited
by the Supreme Court in the Zschernig case as prohibited conduct pur-
portedly occurred in New York courts ....
It should be noted that lower courts in New York, even before the
Zschernig decision, had begun to make distribution to certain Eastern
European beneficiaries. 5 2 The New York legislature reacted adversely to
Zschernig by passing a new statute 53 which tied estate distribution to
the practice of the United States Treasury Department in transmitting
federal benefits, such as those from the Social Security Administration
and from the Veterans Administration, to Eastern European benefici-
aries. 54 However, this legislative attempt to further frustrate distribution
met with little success, since the Soviet Union and most Eastern European
countries, with the exception of Albania and East Germany, were soon
removed from this "Treasury list."' 5 Thus, even though New York's
48. 22 N.Y.2d at 352 n.2, 239 N.E.2d at 553 n.2, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 685 n.2.
49. Id. at 352, 239 N.E.2d at 553, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 685-86.
50. 389 U.S. at 440-41.
51. 22 N.Y.2d at 352 n.3, 239 N.E.2d at 553 n.3, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 686 n.3.
52. See, e.g., Kina's Estate, 29 App. Div. 2d 563, 286 N.Y.S.2d 773, affd, 23N.Y.2d 720, 244 N.E.2d 57, 296 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1967) (Poland) ; Krasowski's Estate,28 App. Div. 2d 180, 283 N.Y.S.2d 960, appeal denied, 22 N.Y.2d 827, 239 N.E.2d658, 292 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1967) (Poland); Padworski's Estate, 53 Misc. 2d 1043,
281 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sur. Ct. 1967) (U.S.S.R.).
53. N.Y. SURR. CT. PRO. § 2218(1) (McKinney Supp. 1971) (effective June 22,
1968).
54. U.S. Treas. Dep't Circular 665, 31 C.F.R. § 211.2 (Supp. 1972). 31 U.S.C.§ 123 (1970) provides, in relevant part, that:[N]o check or warrant drawn against funds of the United States, or any agency
or instrumentality thereof, shall be sent from the United States . . . for deliveryin a foreign country in any case in which the Secretary of the Treasury determines
that postal, transportation, or banking facilities in general, or local conditions in
the country to which such check or warrant is to be delivered, are such that
there is not a reasonable assurance that the payee will actually receive such
check or warrant and be able to negotiate the same for full value . ...
55. Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics were dropped from the list on July 14, 1968. 33 Fed. Reg. 9708(1968). Albania, communist-controlled China, Cuba, North Korea, North Vietnam,
the Russian Zone of Occupation of Germany, and the Russian Sector of Occupation
of Berlin, Germany, remain on the list. 31 C.F.R. § 211.2(a) (Supp. 1972).
COMMENT
7
Lawler: The Demise of the Iron Curtain Statute
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1972
56 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 18
"iron curtain" statute is formally still in effect, in practice, it does not
prevent distribution to any socialist country. 6
A lower court case illustrating the limited area wherein Eastern
European beneficiaries are still having some difficulty obtaining distribu-
tion in New York is In re Becher.57 In Becher, an East German bene-
ficiary personally appeared before the surrogate to claim funds. The
claimant argued that, since the federal government allowed money to be
paid to aliens if they appear in countries to which funds may be trans-
mitted, the provision in the New York statute based on the Treasury
regulation likewise was avoided by his appearance in the United States.5"
The surrogate disagreed, stating that "the Federal regulation and the
New York statute are neither co-extensive nor do they necessarily have
the same purpose."5 9 The court held that since the statute on its face
applied to any alien legatee "domiciled or resident within" one of the
proscribed countries, no exception could be judicially imposed in favor
of one who temporarily left the place of his domicile or residence to
collect such funds. 60 Although the claimant was found to have sustained
his burden of proof in establishing that he would indeed have the use,
benefit, and control of the funds, and although distribution was, in fact,
made to him, the dicta of the court was clearly the same type of em-
barrassing opinionating which the Supreme Court criticized at length in
Zschernig.61 In Becher, the surrogate stated:
Apparently, it is even possible for petitioner to engage in a small
business even employing a few employees if he wishes, though of
course as I think is well known, Communist countries discourage or
prohibit private enterprise that involves the employment - "exploi-
tation" in their terms - of employees in commercial and economic
enterprises, or private ownership of the means of production or
distribution ....
On the whole, I am satisfied that if petitioner is permitted to
receive the . . . inheritance . . . he will have the use, benefit and
control of that money roughly comparable, within the limitations of
the Communist system, to the use, benefit and control of a similar
amount in this country. 2
On the face of the statute, a nonresident alien claiming funds in New
York must carry the burden of proving that he will enjoy the use, benefit,
and control of the funds if distributed to him. 63 In reality, however, once
"use, benefit and control" are established in a "test case," the issue is not
56. Telephone interview with Robert J. Silberstein, Esq., Wolf Popper Ross
Wolf & Jones, New York City, attorneys-in-fact for claimants in Becher and
Demczuk, Oct. 6, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Silberstein Interview].
57. 61 Misc. 2d 46, 304 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Sur. Ct. 1969).
58. Id. at 48, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 48, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
61. 389 U.S. at 437-39 n.8.
62. 61 Misc. 2d at 49, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
63. N.Y. SURR. CT. PRO. § 2218(1) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
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retried in the absence of an offer of proof of change of condition or
an offer of new evidence. 64
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in In re Kish's Estate,0 5 upheld
the constitutionality of New Jersey's statute. 6 In doing so, it was, it is
submitted, more honest to the Zschernig rationale than were the courts
in Montana and New York. The Kish court admitted that "[t]here can
be no doubt that the application of [the statute] by New Jersey courts in
the past - and, indeed, in this very case - has been constitutionally
erroneous under Zschernig.' '67 According to its interpretation of Zsch-
ernig, New Jersey's statute was valid, but only (1) when transmission or
delivery is prohibited by the federal government or (2) "where it is
clear that receipt or use is forbidden or made impossible by the law of the
beneficiary's country, in whatever form such law may take under that
nation's governmental or jurisprudential system, to be ascertained by
what Mr. Justice Douglas referred to as 'a routine reading of foreign
laws'." 68 The court directed that probate courts not involve themselves
in "matters of the practical administration of foreign laws, not prohibitory
or confiscatory on their face." 69 Moreover, they should not predicate a
decision on a comparison of political,' social, or economic sytems or take
judicial notice of "common knowledge" of conditions in foreign countries.70
The Kish court addressed itself to another recurring suggestion made
when distribution to "iron curtain" beneficiaries is attempted. The New
Jersey Attorney General had argued that the manner of transmission of
funds to the Hungarian claimant would result in substantial diminution
of the beneficiary's share, since more Hungarian forints to the dollar might
be purchased on the so-called "free" or "black market" foreign exchange
market in New York City than on the official, non-commercial rate of
exchange established by Hungary. 71 The court, noting that "[w]e do not
think that the rate of exchange of dollars for local currency is ordinarily
an appropriate consideration under Zschernig,"72 rightly held that "[n]o
court of this state should be a party to a violation of foreign law by
authorizing purchase of currency on the 'free' market for attempted trans-
mission to a foreign nation in payment of a distributive share," since, in
common with the foreign exchange regulations of many nations, it is illegal
to bring or transmit forints into Hungary.73 As with the New York court
in Becher,74 the New Jersey court held that:
64. Silberstein Interview, supra note 56.
65. 52 N.J. 454, 246 A.2d 1 (1968).
66. Id. at 466, 246 A.2d at 8. See N.J. REv. STAT. § 3A:25-10 (1953).
67. 52 N.J. at 468, 246 A.2d at 8-9.
68. Id. at 466, 246 A.2d at 8.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 469, 246 A.2d at 9.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 469-70, 246 A.2d at 9-10.
74. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
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[Alithough the inclusion of a country on the Treasury list has been
utilized as a basis for withholding distribution of estate shares, we
do not consider this to be a valid basis for such action, so long as there
are reliable means of delivery of private monies to the beneficiary in
the particular country and the law of that country does not dictate
confiscation. 75
The court correctly pointed out that the Treasury regulation does not
constitute a prohibition with respect to nongovernmental funds, and noted
specifically that it was not considered at all in the Zschernig opinion, in
which the claimants were from East Germany, a country still on the list.76
The court explained that Treasury determination might well "involve
political or other considerations not relevant to remittances of private
funds. '77 Thus, in New Jersey, although its custodial statute is nominally
still valid, the burden of proof rests upon the party seeking to bring it
into operation, and not on the foreign claimant. 78
Ohio has dealt similarly with its statute.7 9 In Mora v. Battin,80
Czechoslovakian heirs to an Ohio estate brought suit in federal district
court, on behalf of all Czechoslovakian nationals similarly situated, against
the probate judge of the county in which the decedent was domiciled at
death challenging the constitutionality of the Ohio act. The defendant
moved to dismiss the action as moot, submitting an affidavit to the effect
that, in light of the Zschernig decision, he had abandoned "his practice
of refusing, as a matter of policy, distribution of assets to heirs residing
in Communist countries." 8' His new policy, he averred, would be "simply
to follow normal practices with respect to ascertaining the identity of
foreign heirs and their right and ability to receive their distributive
shares.18 2 The defendant-judge's representations as to his future con-
duct were not, of course, sufficient to render the controversy moot; not
only were the plaintiffs entitled to more than such assurances, but the
court pointed out that the defendant was required by his oath of office
to uphold the law of Ohio and would be powerless to give such a guar-
antee of nonenforcement.83 It was, therefore, specifically to prevent
applications of the challenged provision "either in whole or in part, in-
directly, or in a limited manner, in the future" that the court decided
plaintiffs' case on the merits. 84 The Ohio court, mindful of Zschernig's
precise mandate, held its statute unconstitutional in part. To the extent
75. 52 N.J. at 470, 246 A.2d at 10.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 462, 246 A.2d at 8.
79. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.81 (Page 1968).
80. 303 F. Supp. 660 (N.D. Ohio 1969). A three-judge court was convened pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284 (1970).
81. 303 F. Supp. at 661.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 662.
84. Id.
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the statute called for a determination of lack of "benefit or use or con-
trol . . . because of circumstances prevailing at the place of residence" 8 5
of the payee and to the extent it required "an inquiry into the operations
of the foreign government and into the political, economic, and social
conditions prevailing in the foreign country," it was deemed invalid;86
to the extent it merely directed the local court's attention to the statutory
law of a foreign country, it was deemed valid.8 7
California and Pennsylvania have followed the broader outline of the
Zschernig doctrine. These states have adopted the position of Justices
Stewart and Brennan, concurring in Zschernig, that such statutes were
impossible of constitutional application. In every case they called for a
nisi prius judge to evaluate economic systems of various foreign govern-
ments, and thus interfered with the exclusive right of the federal govern-
ment to conduct foreign affairs.88
California's reciprocity statute 9 had been upheld as constitutional
on its face without any evaluation of the manner of its application in
Clark v. Allen.90 However, the California Court of Appeals held in
Estate of Kraemer9l that, "under the same [Zschernig] rationale, section
259 of the Probate Code of the State of California, which is substantially
a restatement of sub-division 1 of the Oregon Revised Statute, must also
fall, and for the same reason." 92 This is particularly appropriate in light
of Justice Douglas' assertion, in distinguishing Clark v. Allen from
Zschernig, that "had we been reviewing the later California decision of
Estate of Gogabashvele . . . the additional problems we now find with
the Oregon provision would have been presented." 98
In Demczuk Estate,94 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, noting
that "[c]onsiderable doubt concerning the constitutionality of the Iron
Curtain Act was raised by the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Zschernig v. Miller, expressed its wish to "lay to rest any ques-
tions concerning the validity of the Iron Curtain Act of 1953." 9' The
Attorney General of the Commonwealth had previously "conceded" that
the act was unconstitutional.96 "In the interest of clarification for bench
and bar alike," the court straightforwardly declared the statute "consti-
tutionally infirm. ' 97 As the court stated, there could be no serious ques-
85. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.81 (Page 1968).
86. 303 F. Supp. at 664.
87. Id.
88. 389 U.S. at 442.
89. CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 1956).
90. See text accompanying notes 11-34 supra.
91. 276 Cal. App. 2d 715, 81 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Ct. App. 1969).
92. Id. at 725, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
93. 389 U.S. at 432 n.5 (citation omitted).
94. 444 Pa. 212, 282 A.2d 700 (1971).
95. Id. at 216, 282 A.2d at 701-02.
96. Id. at 216, 282 A.2d at 702.
97. Id.
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tion but that the Pennsylvania statute had been unconstitutionally applied
in the past;98 for the future, the act would be "of no further force or
effect in this Commonwealth."' "
Earlier, in Krepinevich Estate,100 the same court had offered the
Commonwealth, on remand, an opportunity to prove that the claimant
therein would not have had the actual benefit, use, enjoyment, or control
of the money or other property as required by the act, but warned that
if the Commonwealth were to decide to raise the issue it should be
prepared to argue the statute's constitutionality in light of Zschernig.'10
Previously, in Struchmanczuk Estate,102 the Orphans' Court of Phila-
delphia County had held the act unconstitutional, relying on Zschernig.
It should be noted that the Attorney General of the Commonwealth was
represented in Struchmanczuk but took no appeal. In Sapcaru v. Klein,x'0
a three-judge federal court dismissed as moot a suit to enjoin as unconstitu-
tional the further use of the act on the stipulation of the Attorney General
that he would take no appeal from the decision in Struchmanczuk. Simi-
larly, other Pennsylvania orphans' courts had also ruled the act invalid.10 4
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Demczuk did not simply stop
with declaring the "iron curtain" act unconstitutional. It completely re-
characterized the "unclean" status which a claimant residing in a com-
munist country had had before the orphans' courts of Pennsylvania, thus
removing any possible doubt as to the viability of the "iron curtain" act,
regardless of how carefully it was applied. The court stated that a foreign
claimant is "to be treated no differently than if he were living in a sister
state . . ."105 In Demczuk, decedent's son, being the sole legatee and
residing in the Soviet Union, claimed funds on deposit with the Common-
wealth. The lower court, 10 6 although accepting the unconstitutionality of
the act, attempted to avoid distribution by imposing a traditionally more
stringent burden of proof upon the Soviet claimant, while at the same
98. See Belemecich's Estate, 411 Pa. 506, 192 A.2d 740 (1963), cited in Zschernig
v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 437-38 n.8 (1968). See generally Jones, Iron Curtain Dis-
tributees: A Mounting Problem in Pennsylvania's Orphans' Courts, 69 DICK. L. REv.227 (1965); Jones, Pennsylvania's Custodial Statutes: Orphans' Court Proceedingsfor Recovery of Nonescheated Funds, 39 TEMP. L.Q. 153 (1966) (remarkably similar
to his first-cited article, but with a procedural gloss) ; Snyder & Stander, DistributiveRights of Foreign Beneficiaries as Affected by State Action - Recent Pennsylvania
Developments, 63 DICK. L. REv. 297 (1959).
99. 444 Pa. at 217, 282 A.2d at 703.
100. 433 Pa. 78, 248 A.2d 844 (1969).
101. Distribution was eventually made to decedent's widow, the claimant inKrepinevich. by decree of the lower court. In re Estate of Krepinevich, No. 418
(Orphans' Ct. Butler, May 26, 1972).
102. 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 155 (Orphans' Ct. Phila. 1968).
103. Civil No. 68-239 (E.D. Pa., Nov. 14, 1968).
104. See Adams Estate, 19 Fiduc. Rep. 442 (Orphans' Ct. Mont. 1969) ; Kwiedora-
wicz Estate, 19 Fiduc. Rep. 568 (Orphans' Ct. Schuyl. 1969) ; Kuhn Estate, 18 Fiduc.
Rep. 396 (Orphans' Ct. Bucks 1968).
105. 444 Pa. at 218, 282 A.2d at 703.
106. 20 Bucks 218 (Orphans' Ct. 1970).
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time denying letters rogatory10 7 which might have enabled the claimant to
meet such a burden.'0 8
Although the law pursuant to which funds were deposited with the
Commonwealth indefinitely may no longer be employed in Pennsylvania,
it is not clear whether probate judges, who have routinely applied the act
in the past, will be anxious to apply the new law favoring distribution to
Eastern European claimants. An attorney presenting a claim on behalf of
a client residing halfway around the world, and with whom he has no
personal, direct contact, has a uniquely difficult task. A judge at nisi prius,
intent on frustrating distribution of funds behind what he still regards as
an "iron curtain," can thwart distribution by imposing unreasonable re-
quirements on proof of identity. Counsel, whose claim is based on foreign
documents and whose only contact with his client is a signature on a
power of attorney, faces evidentiary problems not common to most estate
cases. Therefore, the remainder of this Comment will review, using
Pennsylvania as an example, certain problems in identification of heirs,
counsel's proof of authority to appear on an heir's behalf, and problems
presently involved in collecting funds previously withheld.
The problem of proving the identity of foreign claimants in these
cases has always posed a great problem for local counsel. It can easily
be imagined how difficult it might be to satisfy a skeptic of one's identity
w ore he to refuse to believe that one was in fact the person one claimed
to be. The traditional burden of proof on foreign claimants in these cases
derives from Link's Estate,1 0 9 and has been followed in a line of Penn-
sylvania cases:no
[T]he evidence must be so clear, precise and definite in quality and
quantity as to satisfy the court below that the relationship claimed
existed."'
107. A letter rogatory is "[t]he medium whereby one country, speaking through
one of its courts, requests another country, acting through its own courts . . . to assist
the administration of justice in the former country." BLACK's LAw DiCTIONARY 1050
(rev. 4th ed. 1968).
108. 20 Bucks at 222. Since the supreme court held the statute unconstitutional and
found that claimant had established his identity and entitlement to the funds, it did not
reach the issue as to whether denial of letters rogatory by the lower court constituted
reversible error. It seems clear, however, that a resident of the U.S.S.R. is entitled
to the use of letters rogatory in order to prove his claim in any American court. See
Execution of Letters Rogatory, Exchange of Notes with the Soviet Union, Nov. 22,
1935, 49 Stat. 3840 (1935), E.A.S. No. 83. In particular, the agreement provided that
"should a Soviet court encounter [difficulty in obtaining the execution of letters
rogatory by American courts], my Government [United States] would, it is under-
stood, upon its attention being drawn thereto through the diplomatic channel, con-
sider what steps it might appropriately take with a view to eliminating further diffi-
culty." Id. at Para. 1. Cf. PA. R. Civ. P. 4003, 4015. Thus, with regard to the Soviet
Union, it would seem that any unusual requirements imposed by local probate courts
would be violative of express national foreign policy. See also Consular Convention
with Russia, June 1, 1964, [1968] 19 U.S.T. 5018, T.I.A.S. No. 6503 (effective July
13, 1%8).
109. 319 Pa. 513, 522-23, 180 A. 1, 5 (1935).
110. See Krepinevich Estate, 433 Pa. 78, 248 A.2d 844 (1969); Bokey Estate,
412 Pa. 244, 194 A.2d 194 (1963) ; Garrett Estate, 371 Pa. 284, 89 A.2d 531 (1952);
Davis Estate, 365 Pa. 605, 76 A.2d 643 (1950).
111. 319 Pa. at 522-23, 180 A. at 5 (emphasis added).
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The nature of the burden of proof that a foreign claimant must establish
is critical in that, if he fails to establish his "identity," even with the
"iron curtain" act inoperative, his inheritance is deposited with the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 1 2
In Demczuk, the decedent had a will leaving his entire estate to his
son, whose name and address were recited therein.11 The court indicated
that, in such a case, the "severe" burden of proof articulated in Link's
Estate was inapplicable." 4 justice Roberts explained that in an intestacy,
a claimant must prove both (1) that the decedent died survived by
qualified statutory heirs and (2) that he is one of such heirs." 5 In a will
case, however, the existence of an heir is attested to by the will, and the
claimant need only establish that he is that heir. The "clear, precise, and
definite" standard is, therefore, "inappropriate."" ' 6 The absence of an
adverse claimant over a long period of time itself constitutes an item of
evidence in favor of a claimant.1 7 This fact is particularly significant in
these cases, since in a great many estates the same people have sought
their inheritance over a period of twenty years or more.118 A claimant
under a will need simply prove "by a preponderance of competent evi-
dence" that he is, in fact, the individual named in the will.""
A related aspect in the representation of "iron curtain" claimants is
that even an attorney's authority to act on behalf of his client may be
questioned. Although attorneys who have been admitted to the bars
of the various counties as officers of the court regularly appear on behalf
of estate claimants without proof of any authority to act on behalf of
anyone, in "iron curtain" cases some probate courts continue to question
112. See Act of Apr. 9, 1929, Pamph. L. 343 § 1314 (repealed by Disposition
of Abandoned and Unclaimed Property Act, PA. STAT. tit. 27, § 1-30(a) (5) (Supp.
1972). The relationship of the Act of 1929 to the "iron curtain" act is set forth in
Boke, Estate, 412 Pa. 244, 253-54, 192 A.2d 194, 198-99 (1963) :
The legislative intendment in the 1953 statute is clear; authority was thereby con-
ferred upon a court to withhold the distribution of property to persons behind
the Iron Curtain where the court is convinced that the "beneficiary would not have
the actual benefit, use, enjoyment or control of ... the property to be distributed."
To bring into play the 1953 Act two conditions must be established; (1) the
identity of the person or persons entitled to distribution and (2) a conviction on
the part of the court that, if the property is distributed, such person or persons
will not receive the actual benefit, use, enjoyment or control of the property.
The Act of 1929 applies (a) where moneys have not been awarded, i.e., where
there is a possibility of heirs but their identities have not been established, or (b)
where moneys have been awarded but the whereabouts of the heirs are unknown,
i.e., where the identities of the heirs but not their whereabouts have been
established.
Application of the Act of 1929 has, in fact, generally only come about where
no claim was made by counsel for the heirs at the audit. Interview with James Francis
Lawler, Esq., counsel for claimants in Demczuk, in Philadelphia, Sept. 23, 1972
[hereinafter cited as Lawler Interview].
113. 444 Pa. at 213-14, 282 A.2d at 701.
114. Id. at 217-18, 282 A.2d at 703.
115. Id. at 218, 282 A.2d at 703.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Lawler Interview, supra note 112.
119. 444 Pa. at 218, 282 A.2d at 703.
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an attorney's standing, even when presented with a duly executed power
of attorney authenticated by a United States Consul.' 2 0 The Pennsyl-
vania courts have consistently held that such a power of attorney proved
"nothing more than that the person signing the document claimed to be
the person whose name he signed unless there is additional corroborative
evidence .... ,u12 Although the weight to be given such a power of attor-
ney on the issue of identity was thus severely limited, it is interesting
to note that Bokey Estate,2 2 from which the doctrine stems, was, in fact,
a victory for the Soviet heirs involved. The appeal in Bokey was by a
local resident claiming to be a first cousin whose claim had been rejected
in the lower court. Even while holding that the Soviet claimants had not
established their own entitlement to the funds, the supreme court did find
that their claim was sufficiently proven to deny the funds to the appellant.
Demczuk also represents a major step forward in this area. The
power of attorney of the decedent's son in Demczuk contained a certificate
of acknowledgment executed by the United States Consul at Moscow in
which he certified that "before me personally appeared [the claimant]
to me personally known and known to me to be the individual described
in, whose name is subscribed to, and who executed the annexed instru-
ment.' 23  The court indicated that such an acknowledgment was not
merely the "official act of a foreign notary . . . authenticated by the local
American consul . . . but rather one where the Consul himself has
certified that he personally knows the individual in question. . . . This
particular certificate is of significant probative value in determining
claimant's identity."'21 4 Although the court relied heavily on the power
120. Lawler Interview, mipra note 112.
121. Krepinevich Estate, 433 Pa. 78, 85, 248 A.2d 844, 847 (1969). See Bokey
Estate, 412 Pa. 244, 251-52, 194 A.2d 194, 198 (1963); Slotkin's Estate, 40 Pa.
D. & C.2d 334, 339 (1965), aff'd per curiam, 423 Pa. 628, 222 A.2d 597 (1966);
Malika's Estate, 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 736, 739 (1963).
122. 412 Pa. 244, 194 A.2d 844 (1969).
123. 444 Pa. at 219-20, 282 A.2d at 704. 22 C.F.R. §§ 92.30 et seq. (Supp. 1972),
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
§ 92.30 Acknowledgment defined.
An acknowledgment is a proceeding by which a person who has executed an
instrument goes before a competent officer or court and declares it to be his act
and deed, to entitle it . . . to be received in evidence without further proof
of execution ....
§ 92.31 Taking an acknowledgment.
(c) Satisfactory identification of grantor(s). The consular officer must be
certain of the identity of the parties making an acknowledgment. If he is not
personally acquainted with the parties, he should require from each some evidence
of identity, such as a passport, police identity card, or the like .... Mere intro-
duction of a person not known to the notarizing officer, without further proof of
identity, is not considered adequate identification for acknowledgment purposes.
124. 444 Pa. at 220, 282 A.2d at 704, citing Act of April 27, 1876, PA. STAT. tit.
28, § 223 (1958), which provides that the official acts and exemplifications of foreign
notaries in accordance with the laws of their respective countries, authenticated by the
local American consul, "shall be prima facie evidence of the matter therein set forth."
The Act has been construed to refer solely to the matters set forth by the notary, and
not to those of the affiants, since the notary's authority is simply to certify the fact
of execution. Bokey Estate, 412 Pa. 244, 251-52, 194 A.2d 194, 198 (1963), citing
Act of July 24, 1941, PA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 291.4, 291.5 (1955).
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of attorney executed personally before the United States Consul, it did
not hold such a power to be a necessary item of proof in all such cases. It
is submitted that it would be neither realistic nor fair to demand, as a rule
in these cases, powers executed before the Consul. At present, the United
States maintains only one consulate in the Soviet Union, and that is in
Moscow. 125 It would not be feasible for a claimant of a smaller estate
to make the journey from his village to Moscow - sometimes thousands
of miles across the Soviet Union - to obtain a relatively small legacy.
Closely related to the problem of establishing "identity" are evi-
dentiary questions regarding the admissibility and weight to be accorded
documents and affidavits prepared in foreign countries. Quite often a
claimant's case is based entirely on documents of vital statistics, often
necessarily reconstructed because of destruction of archives during the
wartime period, and on statements concerning the family of the decedent
by disinterested residents from the village of the decedent's emigration.
In Link's Estate,126 the court rejected such ex parte affidavits as incom-
petent, holding them to be "generally inadmissible as not being the best
evidence, especially when the persons making them are living and able to
testify either in court or by deposition. ' 127 The estate left by Link was,
in the court's opinion, "well worth a trip from Germany ... if [claimants]
had sufficient faith in their cause . .. ."12 Direct testimony, the court
advised, should be insisted upon in pedigree cases: "If a chain of relation-
ship [could] be built up through birth certificates and ex parte statements,
as offered here, there would be no escheated estates in Pennsylvania.' 1 29
In Bokey Estate, the court rejected a letter, from one of the claimants
to her counsel, dated after the death of the decedent, which it considered
to be "obviously a self-serving, ex parte statement ... clearly inadmissible
in evidence.' u3 0 Emphasizing the importance of the right to confronta-
tion of witnesses - to test by cross-examination the reliability of the
125. Lawler Interview, supra note 112.
126. 319 Pa. 513, 180 A. 1 (1935).
127. Id. at 519, 180 A. at 4.
128. Id. The dissenting opinion of Justice Maxey explained, however, that affiants
were 66, 69, and 81 years of age at the time of making their affidavits:
It is easily understandable that these persons may have been unable, physically or
financially to have made the tedious and expensive trip to the United States from
Germany to testify in this proceeding.
Id. at 542-43, 180 A. at 14.
In larger estates it was often requested that the heirs present themselves in
person before the court, and the circumstances of old age, illness, and fear of traveling
abroad often made it difficult to convince claimants to make the trip. Lawler Interview,
supra note 112.
129. Id. at 522, 180 A. at 5. Pedigree may be proved by certain limited types of
hearsay evidence, including inter alia church records, birth, baptismal, marriage, and
death certificates, family Bibles, ancient documents, tombstones or monuments on
graves with inscriptions thereon, and declarations of members of the family. See 5 J.
WIGMORF, EViDENCE § 1495 (3d ed. 1940). Identity of names, religion, and place
of nativity are competent evidence to show kinship or pedigree, but alone and of
themselves are insufficient to establish a finding of kinship. Garrett Estate, 371 Pa.
284, 287-88, 89 A.2d 531, 532 (1952).
130. Bokey Estate, 412 Pa. 244, 252, 194 A.2d 194, 198 (1963).
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evidence given and to enable the court to see and observe the witness to
better test his credibility, the court directed that "no consideration what-
ever" should have been given to the contents of a letter which "by its very
nature . . . could not be received into evidence nor made the basis for
any findings."' 81
The lower court in Demczuk had before it the standard documenta-
tion in these cases - copies of birth, death, and marriage certificates, and
affidavits of heirship executed by members of the village in which
decedent's family resided. The handwriting on a series of three succes-
sive powers of attorney was identifiably the same. The attitude of the
lower court was clear from its remarks: "three times zero is still no more
than zero ;" the vital statistics certificates were only copies (i.e., not the
original volumes from the belly of archives in the breadbasket of the
Soviet Union) ; and the affidavits were suspect because made in similar
language (indicating presumably an assembly-line production of docu-
ments in order to purloin estate funds from the coffers of the state
treasury) .1 32 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's attitude was markedly
more receptive:
While these pieces of evidence viewed separately might not establish
claimant's identity beyond a reasonable doubt, in the aggregate they
are sufficient to satisfy the requisite burden .... 13
It seems clear, after Demczuk, that courts at nisi prius in Pennsylvania
may no longer rule inadmissible nor discredit the value of this type of
foreign evidence. Where corroborated by testimony of local heirs or
friends of the decedent or where "real evidence," such as letters from the
decedent in possession of the claimants, or to the decedent found among
his effects, such additional documentary evidence should be conclusive.
IV. DISTRIBUTION DENIED AND DELAYED
Obtaining payment of funds which are on deposit with the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania pursuant to an admittedly unconstitutional statute
has been more difficult than might be expected. A suit following the most
direct route, an assumpsit action against the Commonwealth in the newly
created commonwealth court, was dismissed in Kremin v. Common-
wealth.1 34 The court, while acknowledging the unconstitutionality of the
statute,13 5 held that its provisions pertaining to methods and procedures
for the repayment of such funds from the state treasury were fully
applicable, a conclusion no longer tenable. 136 In addition, the court held
131. Id. at 253, 194 A.2d at 198.
132. 444 Pa. at 221 n.6, 282 A.2d at 704 n.6.
133. Id. at 221, 282 A.2d at 704-05.
134. 1 Pa. Comm. 642 (1971). Distribution has since been made to the decedent's
widow, claimant in Kremin, in In re Estate of Kreminy, No. 1128 of 1961 (Orphans' Ct.
Alleg., Jan. 10, 1972).
135. Id. at 645 n.*.
136. The Act has since been repealed in toto. See note 140 infra.
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that it did not have jurisdiction over such an action due to the Com-
monwealth's immunity from suit. 31 Justice Manderino, in his dissent,
termed such a denial of a forum to the decedent's widow, whose funds
the Commonwealth had taken "without just compensation," an imposition
of a "confiscatory shield :"
Legislative permission to sue the Commonwealth certainly is unneces-
sary when the Commonwealth is holding property which does not
belong to the Commonwealth and a claim is made that the property
belongs to the individual bringing suit to recover the property. 138
The court refused to assert its jurisdiction, in spite of the fact that the
Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970139 vested jurisdiction of "all civil
actions and proceedings against the Commonwealth" in the common-
wealth court.
The "iron curtain" act itself provided that "[alny beneficiary or
person, legally entitled to" any money paid into the state treasury under
the act might "at any time" apply for distribution from the court which
had directed such payment. 140 Upon satisfactory proof of his entitlement
and that he would have "actual possession, benefit, use, enjoyment or
control" of the funds, the court was empowered to order payment out of
the state treasury, with interest at two per cent (2%) from date of
deposit to date of distribution. 141 Where funds have been previously
awarded to a nonresident alien pursuant to the act, his identity and where-
abouts have already been established. In such a case, the funds would
have been distributed to him but for the alleged lack of benefit, use, or
control. 42 Now that the use, benefit, and control restrictions are invalid,
a subsequent claim by that person should involve no issue which would
call for the expertise of a probate court. The claim would be in the
nature of a claim on a savings bank for funds deposited with the institu-
tion in one's own name.
In 1946, when Churchill coined the phrase, there was some justifica-
tion for his metaphor of the "iron curtain." There was a period when
little communication could be had with residents of Eastern European
countries; in fact, some local relatives requested that no letters of inquiry
be sent to their kin in "the old country," because the idea prevailed that
correspondence with capitalist countries might arouse the disfavor of the
government. 143 But the "iron curtain" exists today only as a border,
across which trade and commerce and all the elements of human society
137. 1 Pa. Comm. at 646.
138. Id. at 648.
139. PA. STAT. tit. 17, § 211.401(a) (1) (Supp. 1972).
140. Act of July 28, 1953, Pamph. L. 674, § 4 (repealed by Probate, Estates and
Fiduciaries Code, PA. STAT. tit. 20, § 3 (effective July 1, 1972)).
141. Id.
142. See note 112 and accompanying text supra.
143. Lawler Interview, supra note 112.
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may pass. The goal must be to treat foreign claimants to American estates
equally, whether from Ireland, Israel, or the Soviet Union.
There is a paradigm for the facts of these cases: a Russian peasant
emigrates from Russia to the United States at the time of the Revolution
of 1917 intending to work and save so that his family might follow;
he arrives in the United States, finds a job as a laborer, and lives frugally
while amassing a small estate until his family can join him. It is the
probate courts' responsibility to those men to insure that their estates, the
products of a life of self-denial, are distributed to their kin. In many of
the estates in which the reported cases denied distribution, the judiciary
has since yielded to the spirit of Zschernig.144 Time has worn holes in
the rhetorical "iron curtain," and has metamorphosed it, for the purpose
of estate distribution at least, into a harmless, neighborly cyclone fence.
Denis James Lawler
144. See, e.g., Bokey Estate, 412 Pa. 244, 194 A.2d 194 (1963), distributed, No.
139 of 1960 (Orphans' Ct. Lack., Sept. 9, 1972) ; Hryszko's Estate, 27 Leh. Co. L.J. 39(Orphans' Ct. 1957), distributed, No. 43109 (Feb. 14, 1972) ; Kulchinsky's Estate, 37Pa. D. & C.2d 633 (Orphans' Ct. Phila. 1966), distributed, No. 2445 of 1964 (Nov. 18,
1968) ; Mackarus Estate (No. 3), 41 Pa. D. & C.2d 267 (Orphans' Ct. Phila. 1967),distributed, No. 3494 of 1962 (June 10, 1971) ; Malika's Estate, 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 736(Orphans' Ct. Phila. 1963), distributed, No. 2402 of 1946 (Oct. 20, 1970) ; Martinzik
Estate, 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 701 (Orphans' Ct. Phila. 1962), distributed, No. 587 of 1953(May 8, 1970); Prusak's Estate, 20 Pa. D. & C.2d 329 (Orphans' Ct. Phila. 1964),
distributed, No. 2728 of 1959 (Aug. 2, 1972) ; Slotkin Estate, 40 Pa. D. & C.2d 334(Orphans' Ct. Phila. 1965), distributed, No. 2062 of 1957 (Oct. 30, 1970) ; Soter's
Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 1 (Orphans' Ct. Phila. 1964), distributed, No. 689 of 1960(Nov. 14, 1968) ; Zupko's Estate, 15 Pa. D. & C.2d 442 (Orphans' Ct. Phila. 1959),
distributed, No. 2405 of 1957 (Oct. 8, 1968).
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